INTRODUCTION
If at all a fundamental physical theory can be derived, it is by teleological arguments-from what it is good for. It has been suggested, for instance, that the laws of physics are preconditions (conditions of possibility) of empirical science.
(1) They might, instead, be preconditions of observers, of life, or of chemistry. This article presents arguments in support of the view that both the standard model of elementary particle physics (SM) (2) and general relativity (GR) are preconditions of an ''interesting'' world, defined by Squires (3) as one that contains chemistry. It further suggests that the very existence of stable, spatially extended material objects, if not the very existence of a physical world, may require the validity of the SM and GR, at least as effective theories.
It is well known, but rarely sufficiently appreciated, that matter owes its stability at least in part to the indefiniteness of the relative positions between its constituents. Section 2 shows that the proper way of dealing with indefinite properties or values leads straight to the existence of a unique density operator and the familiar trace rule of quantum mechanics (QM). Section 3 explains why the vector space of QM must be complex. Section 4 derives the local metric structure of the world, which is described by special relativity. Section 5 demonstrates that the only possible effects on the motion of a scalar particle are those represented by the vector potential A and the metric tensor g. Section 6 traces the steps leading to quantum field theory in general and to quantum electrodynamics (QED) in particular, argues that QED and GR are necessary but not sufficient for chemistry, and presents arguments in support of the following: The electroweak and strong forces-U(1) é SU(2) é SU(3)-together with GR constitute the simplest theoretical structure consistent with chemistry. Sections 7 and 8 put forward arguments suggesting that the very stability of matter, if not the very existence of the physical world, implies both the SM and GR.
The final sections address a couple of related issues. Section 8 suggests that the final theory envisaged by Weinberg (4) and others may be nothing more than the best effective theory, and Sec. 9 argues that perhaps we don't need a quantum theory of gravity, in as much as all that such a theory would allow us to do is investigate the world on scales that do not exist.
THE ORIGIN OF THE TRACE RULE
An obvious feature of our world is the stability of matter. By this I mean the existence of spatially extended material objects that neither explode nor implode the moment they are formed. It is well known that matter owes this feature in part to the indefiniteness of the relative positions between its constituents; together with the exclusion principle it ''fluffs out'' matter. The importance of indefiniteness for the obvious stability of matter can hardly be overstated. This makes it an excellent starting point for a derivation of the laws of QM. As is explained elsewhere, (6) (7) (8) the proper way of dealing with variables with indefinite values is to make counterfactual probability assignments. If an observable is said to have an ''indefinite value,'' what is meant is that it does not have a value (inasmuch as no value is indicated) but that it would have a value if one were indicated, and that positive probabilities are associated with at least two possible values.
The most important feature of observables with indefinite values is that their values are extrinsic. Since the indefiniteness of an observable implies that it sometimes does and sometimes does not have a value, a criterion is called for, and this is the existence of a value-indicating fact-an actual event or state of affairs from which the value can in principle be
